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Abstract
In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) highlight that Miller
and Modigliani’s (1961) proof of dividend irrelevance is based on the assumption that the
amount of dividends distributed to shareholders is equal or greater than the free cash flow
generated by the fixed investment policy. They claim that, if retention is allowed, dividend
policy is not irrelevant. This paper clarifies and reinterprets DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s
result: Retention itself has not to do with dividend irrelevance, which holds even in case
of retention. The key assumption has to do with the NPV of the extra funds (either
retained or raised): If NPV is zero, dividend irrelevance applies. Yet, the dichotomy
retention/no-retention is useful, because if agency problems are present, managers tend
to retain funds and invest them in negative-NPV projects, and therefore the zero-NPV
assumption must be removed, so that dividend irrelevance does not apply any more.
Keywords. Dividend policy, irrelevance, retention, zero-NPV, epistemology, agency theory.
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Relevance or irrelevance of retention
for dividend policy irrelevance
Carlo Alberto Magni
Introduction
In an interesting recent paper, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) revisit Miller and Modigliani’s
(1961) paper on dividend policy irrelevance and claim that dividend policy is not irrelevant.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (henceforth, often DD) underline the fact that Miller and Modiglia-
ni (henceforth, often MM), assume that 100% or more of the free cash flow is distributed
to shareholders, thus shunting aside the possibility of retention. According to DD, the as-
sumption of no-retention made by MM makes dividend irrelevance a “meaningless tautology”
(p. 306). If retention is allowed, then dividend policy is relevant, because managers could
choose suboptimal policies by investing in non-zero NPV projects.
This paper shows that relevance or irrelevance of dividend policy has not to do with
retention; it has to do with the rate of return of the extra funds used for reinvestment or
financing: Dividend policy is irrelevant if and only if zero-NPV activities are undertaken,
with or without assumption of retention. The paper is structured as follows.
• Section 1:
- A formal unambiguous definition of dividend policy irrelevance is given
- It is proved that dividend policy irrelevance holds if and only if the extra activities
are zero-NPV activities. Therefore, MM’s thesis extends to the retention case
- It is shown that MM’s assumption of fairly priced stocks is (sufficient but) not nec-
essary for dividend irrelevance
- It is underlined that the case of retention give managers full control on shareholders’
wealth, as opposed to the case of no-retention
• Section 2:
- DD’s definition of dividend irrelevance is shown to be unnecessarily rigid and based on
semantic conventions. While not all feasible dividend policies are optimal, all fea-
sible dividend policies are optimal if the zero-NPV assumption is taken (regardless
of retention)
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- DD’s correct stance about misconceptions of dividend irrelevance is underlined: Not
only investment policy matters, dividend policy is an important determinant as
well
• Section 3:
- DD’s worry about assumptions that constrain MM’s thesis to be valid is shown to be
unwarranted: The role of assumptions in deductive logic is just to constrain the
thesis to be valid
- DD’s concern on retention is fruitfully reinterpreted as a regard for agency problems.
If agency problems are present, then managers are inclined to retain funds and
undertake negative-NPV projects
- The concern for agency problems means that the zero-NPV assumption is deemed
inappropriate and should be dismissed. In this sense, DD’s stance is agreeable.
Table 1. Main notational conventions
at free cash flow
dt dividends
ht (=dt − at) extra funds
% cost of capital
FCF free cash flow
n liquidation date
DD DeAngelo and DeAngelo
MM Miller and Modigliani
~h stream of extra funds
~0 null vector
V (~h) value of the firm as a function of dividend policy
ZA Zero-NPV Assumption
EA Each-ness Assumption
hnt compound amount of ht
rt internal rate of return of extra activity
N number of outstanding shares at time 0
∆N new shares issued at time 1
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1 The Zero-NPV assumption and the irrelevance of retention
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (DD) shed light on a neglected issue: Miller and Modigliani (MM)
prove the dividend irrelevance theorem by excluding the possibility of retaining part of the
free cash flow (FCF) generated by the investment policy. That is, MM focus on the case
where a firm distributes a fraction of FCF equal or greater than one. According to DD, it is
just this assumption that enables MM to prove dividend irrelevance. If retention is allowed,
i.e. if managers may choose to distribute only a fraction of the FCF smaller than one, then,
according to DD, dividend policy is relevant.
Our analysis maintains MM’s assumptions of a frictionless market (no taxes, no flotations
costs, no transaction costs), and it is assumed that a firm is incorporated at time 0 and
liquidated at time n.1 The firm is assumed to be unlevered and to follow a fixed (optimal)
investment policy, which generates periodic free cash flows at, available for distribution to
shareholders at time t, t = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Because this paper aims at showing that relevance or irrelevance has not to do with
retention or no-retention, we first provide a formal unambiguous definition of dividend irrele-
vance, to avoid any semantic misunderstanding (see next section). Letting dt be the dividend
distributed at time t, we give the following
Definition 1. The dividend policy is said to be irrelevant if and only if
n∑
t=1
at
(1 + %)t
=
n∑
t=1
dt
(1 + %)t
for any dt, t = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. (1)
Let ht ∈ R be the extra funds, i.e. ht = dt − at, and let ~h := (h1, h2, . . . , hn−1). Then, the
above definition states that dividend policy is irrelevant if, whatever the dividends, the firm
value does not change: V (~h) = V (~0) for any choice of ~h.2 Note that ht may be positive
(dividends are greater than FCF) or negative (FCF are not entirely distributed). In the
former case, financing is needed to raise funds, in the latter case projects must be chosen
where the extra funds retained are invested.
The case ht > 0 is assumed by MM, whereas DD focus on the case ht < 0.
1The assumption of a finite-time horizon is by no means restrictive, but we believe it is conceptually more
salient and, strictly speaking, more realistic than the assumption of a firm that is everlasting. DeAngelo and
DeAngelo themselves use this assumption for a better illustration. In real-life evaluation, this is actually a
common assumption.
2The final hn (and therefore, the final dn) is not arbitrary, because it is determined by the previous extra
funds (see Remark 1 below).
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Zero-NPV assumption (ZA). Dividend policy is such that
n∑
t=1
ht
(1 + %)t
= 0. (2)
Proposition 1. Dividend policy is irrelevant if and only if ZA holds.
Proof. Eq. (1) holds if and only if eq. (2) holds.
The above Proposition says that, if the use of extra funds is value-neutral, then current
stockholders’ wealth does not change. Stated equivalently, it says that dividend policy is
irrelevant if the full present value of FCF is distributed to shareholders.
Remark 1. It is worth noting that
∑n
t=1
ht
(1+%)t = 0 is equivalent to
hn = −
n−1∑
t=1
ht(1 + %)n−t (3)
which highlights the dependence of hn on the previous extra funds. The amount hn may
then be seen as the compound amount of all previous extra activities (reinvestments and/or
financing of extra funds).
For example, if n=2, eq. (2) boils down to
h1
(1 + %)
+
h2
(1 + %)2
= 0
which may be rewritten as
h2 = −h1(1 + %).
If h1 < 0, i.e. retention is chosen, then dividend policy is irrelevant if the amount −h1
is invested in a zero-NPV project. In such a case, the reduction in the first dividend is
compensated by the distribution of an extra dividend h2 > 0 at the final date, such that
the previous reduction is neutralized. If h1 > 0, i.e. more than 100% of a1 is distributed,
then dividend policy is irrelevant if the extra funds are raised from a zero-NPV financing.
In their 1961 paper, MM assume that the extra funds are raised by selling new stocks, and
that the new shareholders expect a rate of return equal to the cost of capital % (stocks
are fairly priced). In other words, it is assumed that the firm finances with a zero-NPV
financing. In such a case, the extra distribution to current shareholders is compensated later
by a distribution of a smaller dividend to those shareholders, which exactly offsets the extra
cash previously received. Irrelevance of dividend policy is then based on the coincidence of
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the cost of capital with the expected rate of return of the extra funds, which means that the
activities undertaken (whether investment or financing) are zero-NPV activities.
Let us have the following
Each-ness Assumption (EA). Each extra fund ht is used for a zero-NPV activity.
The above assumption means that each ht < 0 is invested at the cost of capital, and each
ht > 0 is raised by financing at the cost of capital.
Miller and Modigliani assume EA.
Proposition 2. EA is a sufficient condition for dividend policy irrelevance.
Proof. Let hnt be the compound amount of −ht. EA is formalized as hnt = −ht(1 + %)n−t for
each t, t = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. Therefore, hn is determined as hn =
∑n−1
t=1 h
n
t = −
∑n−1
t=1 ht(1 +
%)n−t, which is just eq. (3), or, equivalently, eq. (2). Using Proposition 1 the result is
obtained.
It is worth noting that EA is sufficient but not necessary: EA implies eq. (2) but is not
implied. Dividend irrelevance may hold even if each extra activity has nonzero NPV. Suppose
the internal rate of return for each activity is rt, with rt 6= %. Then, −ht(1 + rt)n−t = hnt
for each t = 1, 2 . . . , n − 1, which implies hn=−
∑n−1
t=1 h
n
t =−
∑n−1
t=1 ht(1 + r
t)n−t whence∑n
t=1
ht
(1+rt)t = 0. However, dividend irrelevance still holds if
∑n
t=1
ht
(1+rt)t =
∑n
t=1
ht
(1+%)t ,
because the latter equality implies
∑n
t=1
ht
(1+%)t = 0. Therefore, dividend policy holds if EA
does not hold, provided that % is the internal rate of return (not of each extra activity but)
of the portfolio of all extra activities. In other terms, it is not necessary that each and every
NPV be zero, but only that the NPV of the portfolio be zero (see Table 2). As a result, EA
implies ZA, whereas ZA does not imply EA.3
Table 2. Sufficiency and necessity
Each-ness Assumption Zero-NPV Assumption
Sufficient YES YES
Necessary NO YES
3All the other assumptions are obviously taken as valid: No assumption, separately taken, is sufficient to
achieve MM’s thesis.
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DeAngelo and DeAngelo draw attention to the fact that Miller and Modigliani do not allow
retention policy, so that their irrelevance theorem is “an automatic by-product of the invest-
ment choice” (p. 300). In fact, dividend irrelevance in MM is not automatic, because it rests
on a crucial assumption that is not adequately underlined in DD’s analysis: MM assume that
the firm issues new stocks whose expected rate of return is %. This means that ht is financed
at the cost of capital. Putting it differently, Miller and Modigliani assume EA (in addition
to the assumption of frictionless market).4 According to DD, the major reason why dividend
irrelevance holds in MM’s analysis is their assumption of ht > 0, which rules out retention:
“Automatic optimization of payout policy does occur in Miller and Modigliani (1961), but
only because they mandate 100% FCF payout”(DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 305). As
seen, Propositions 1 and 2 above hold whatever the sign of ht, i.e. they hold regardless of
whether retention is allowed or not. Dividend irrelevance keeps on holding, as long as ZA
is maintained. And, symmetrically, irrelevance does not hold if ZA does not hold, i.e. MM’s
result is not guaranteed by the no-retention assumption.
In the two-period example, suppose FCF is partially retained at time 1, so that h1 < 0;
if they are invested in zero-NPV activities, then
h21 = h2 = −h1(1 + %), (4)
which is equivalent to eq. (2). Suppose, on the contrary, that an extra distribution of FCF is
chosen which is financed with a sale of new stocks. If the rate of return expected by the new
shareholders is the cost of capital %, then new shareholders require their investment to be
a zero-NPV activity. Letting N be the number of outstanding shares, the new shareholders
spend h1 for purchasing ∆N shares of the firm, and will receive dividends for a total of
∆N
(N+∆N)a2 at time 2. Given that the required rate of return is equal to the cost of capital %,
the NPV is zero:
−h1 + ∆Na2(N + ∆N)(1 + %) = 0. (5)
The old shareholders will receive a2 + h2 = N(N+∆N)a2 at time 2, which implies h2 =
− ∆N(N+∆N)a2. Therefore, eq. (5) becomes −h1− h2/(1 + %) = 0 which is equivalent to eq. (4).
4We conventionally view EA (or ZA) as an assumption that is added to the assumption of ‘frictionless
market’ just to underline its importance. Evidently, one can consider the term ‘frictionless market’ as inclusive
of all assumptions. In this sense, dividend irrelevance is indeed automatic given the set of assumptions.
However, the thesis of any possible theorem is automatic in deductive logic, once the set of the assumptions
is accepted (see Section 3).
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In other words, the case of retention (assumed by DD) is mathematically equivalent to
the case of no-retention (assumed by MM). The only difference resides in the sign of ht: If
positive, the activity is a financing; if negative, the activity is an investment. But the sign
itself is immaterial to the thesis of Propositions 1 and 2; MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem
does not depend on the assumption of ht > 0: It holds even if ht < 0, i.e. if retention is
assumed. And, symmetrically, it does not hold if the zero-NPV assumption does not hold,
whether ht is positive or negative. Therefore, while DD correctly state that managers may
choose a suboptimal policy if retention is allowed, their drawing attention to the retention
case as opposed to MM’s assumption of no-retention is, theoretically, a bit misleading. The
fundamental point is: Does EA hold? Or, more precisely, does ZA hold or does it not?
Thus, it is true that MM prove irrelevance by assuming that the firm distributes more
than 100% of FCF (ht > 0), but it is also true that dividend irrelevance holds even in the
case ht < 0, with which MM do not deal. The key assumption regards the sign of the NPV,
not the sign of ht (see Table 3).
Table 3. Dividend policy is...
retention (ht < 0) no-retention (ht > 0)
Zero-NPV irrelevant irrelevant
Nonzero-NPV relevant relevant
The emphasis of DD on the retention case make them neglect that, according to their very
definition of irrelevance, even in the no-retention case irrelevance does not hold if the key
assumption (ZA) is ruled out. That the latter is actually the fundamental assumption in the
dividend irrelevance argument is explicitly stated by MM in their fundamental principle of
valuation at p. 412 and in the following sentence: “Under our basic assumption, however, %
must be the same for all investors, new as well as old. Consequently, the market value of
the dividends diverted to the outsiders, which is both the value of their contribution and the
reduction in terminal value of the existing shares, must always be precisely the same as the
increase in current dividends” (Miller and Modigliani, 1961, p. 420, italics added). Strictly
speaking, they are just assuming EA.
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In other words, the fundamental question is not:
Does the firm pay out more than FCF or does it pay out less than FCF?
which DeAngelo and DeAngelo focus on. The relevant question is:
Are extra activities value-neutral or not?
DD’s paper is actually important because it warns against a common misconception: Div-
idend policy does not count, only investment policy counts. On the contrary, investment
policy is not the only determinant of shareholders’ value; dividend policy is a first-order
determinant as well. DD correctly underline the fact that if ht < 0 managers could act so
as to create agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986): Their focus on
retention just derives from the authors’ will of highlighting the fact that “retention increases
managers’ opportunities to expropriate stockholders” (p. 313) by selecting negative-NPV
projects. Therefore, it is important to warn against misinterpretation of the notion of irrele-
vance. However, dividend relevance itself does not depend on retention, but on fulfillment of
the zero-NPV assumption: Dividend policy is relevant or irrelevant in the sense of Definition
1 depending on whether eq. (2) holds or not, regardless of whether dividends are greater
or smaller than FCF. The fulfillment of eq. (2) means that the full present value of FCF
is distributed to shareholders. And the distribution of the full present value of FCF is the
crucial point, irrespective of ht being positive or negative.
DD’s insistence on the retention/no-retention dichotomy may therefore seem, from a mere
theoretical point of view, a bit overstated. Yet, there is a sense in which their dichotomy
is useful. It has to do with managers’ control on the effects of their actions. If retention
is chosen by managers (ht < 0), the NPV of the reinvestment depends on whether they
choose zero- or nonzero-NPV activities. If, instead, managers choose to distribute dividends
in excess of the FCF (ht > 0), then extra funds are raised by issuing new stocks, whose NPV
does not depend on managers’ actions, but on the rate of return that purchasers of shares
expect to receive in the future. This means that relevance or irrelevance of dividends may
depend on investors’ expectations. If retention is chosen, managers have full control on their
actions and may be tempted to pursue personal objectives. If managers choose distribution
of extra dividends and new shares are issued, shareholders’ wealth is affected by investors’
expectations. This is clearly stated by Jensen (1986, p. 323):
Payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’ control, thereby reducing
managers’ power and making it more likely they will incur the monitoring of the capital
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markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital . . . The problem is how
to motivate managers to disgorge the cash rather than investing it at below the cost of
capital or wasting it on organization inefficiencies.
Retention has to do with the full control of managers on shareholders’ wealth (Table 4).
Table 4. Shareholders’ wealth is controlled by ...
retention (ht < 0) no-retention (ht > 0)
Managers’ actions YES NO
Investors’ expectations NO YES
2 A semantic ambiguity
DeAngelo and DeAngelo do not merely dwell on the retention case; they also become involved
in what seems to be a semantic disquisition regarding the meaning of the term ‘irrelevance’;
they correctly write that
provided that managers distribute the full present value of FCF, the timing of
those payouts is a matter of indifference to stockholders. (p. 303)
In the light of Definition 1 and Propositions 1 and 2, their sentence just means that dividend
policy is irrelevant if EA (or ZA) is assumed. Yet, to DD, “this is not “payout policy irrele-
vance”, since managers can also choose policies in the interior of Fig. 2” (pp. 303-4), i.e. they
can choose suboptimal policies in the feasible set (negative-NPV activities). We notice that
the possibility of choosing suboptimal policies does not invalidate the fact that managers’
actions do not change shareholders’ wealth if the zero-NPV assumption holds, in which case
managers’ actions are irrelevant in determining shareholders’ wealth. DeAngelo and DeAn-
gelo write that irrelevance is a property of the opportunity set and requires “a one-to-one
correspondence between feasible and optimal policies” (p. 294). Therefore, irrelevance means
that “all feasible decisions are optimal” (p. 294, p. 312). Suboptimal policies are possible with
the assumption ht < 0 if eq. (2) does not hold, because in this case not all feasible decisions
are optimal (managers may choose negative-NPV projects). Therefore, DD conclude that
dividend policy is not irrelevant. But this is a semantic convention. One may correctly claim
that “all feasible decisions are optimal if the zero-NPV assumption is assumed”. Whether
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or not managers’ actions change shareholders’ wealth is indeed relevant to shareholders, but,
once established (by assumption) that any of the infinite possible dividend policies is value-
neutral, then it is irrelevant what managers will do. DD write that if zero-NPV activities are
undertaken by managers, policies are indeterminate (p. 301) but not irrelevant. The fact that
policies are indeterminate or not has nothing to do with the fact that policies are irrelevant:
If it has been established by assumption that managers invest the retained funds in zero-NPV
projects, dividend policy is irrelevant. Choosing among zero-NPV projects may perhaps be
indeterminate, but, nonetheless, it is of no relevance to shareholders’ wealth.
Consequently, there is nothing wrong in MM’s result, even if retention is allowed, and
while MM only cope with the assumption ht > 0, their result is easily generalized to the case
ht < 0, as we have shown. And there is nothing semantically wrong in the sentence “dividend
policy is irrelevant if the zero-NPV assumption holds”: It has the same logical status as the
sentence “the debt/equity ratio of a firm is irrelevant if the no-arbitrage assumption holds”.
Essentially, the no-arbitrage principle is to capital structure policy what ZA is to dividend
policy. A formal definition such as Definition 1 may be a useful tool to avoid semantic
ambiguity.
However, despite semantic ambiguities, DD’s stance is rather clear and agreeable: MM’s
irrelevance theorem should not be intended as implying that only investment policy matters,
while dividend policy is of no concern. Given that MM’s theorem may be erroneously inter-
preted as stating that managers’ decisions on dividends do not change shareholders’ wealth,
DD’s paper is welcome. Dividend policy does count, because if eq. (2) does not hold, then
stockholders’ wealth does change with changes in dividend policies.
DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly affirm that “the familiar NPV rule for investments . . .
is not by itself sufficient to ensure stockholder wealth maximization; an NPV rule for payouts
is also necessary (“distribute the full PV of FCF to currently outstanding shares”)” (p. 295):
To assume ZA just boils down to adopting such a rule.
So, DeAngelo and DeAngelo correctly claim that “anything goes” is not true for dividend
policy. However, armed with our Definition 1, we may claim: “Anything goes if the zero-NPV
assumption holds”.
3 Epistemological issues and agency costs
DeAngelo and DeAngelo seem to be particularly worried by the fact that “irrelevance is
hard-wired into MM (1961) by assumptions that shrink the feasible set to optimal policies”
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(p. 294). MM’s assumptions are such that managers are “constrained to choose optimal
policies” (p. 304); in this way, “the firm’s opportunity set is artificially constrained to pay-
out policies that fully distribute free cash flow”. Their worrying about an assumption that
‘constrains’ the firm to act in a way that is irrelevant for shareholders is theoretically un-
warranted. Any mathematical theorem or proposition, any theoretical model that makes use
of deduction is based on assumptions which constrain the thesis to be valid. The role of
assumptions is just to force things so that the thesis is valid. MM’s assumptions are such
that their thesis holds. And we have proved that their thesis holds even with the further
assumption ht < 0, which they do no cope with. To understand why no theoretical problems
arise with MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem, just think of the well-known Extreme Value
Theorem (EVT): If a real-valued function is continuous in a closed, bounded interval [a, b],
then such a function attains both a maximum and a minimum value in [a, b]. Obviously,
the assumptions here force the thesis to be valid. Let the set of all real-valued functions be
the feasible set, and let a choice be defined optimal if a function is chosen which attains a
maximum and minimum value in [a, b]. The assumptions of the EVT force the validity of the
thesis because the choice of any function is optimal if assumptions are met. Therefore, the
choice of any function fulfilling the assumptions is (perhaps indeterminate but nonetheless)
irrelevant. It is evident that the original feasible set (real-valued functions) is now restricted
to a narrower set (real-valued functions continuous in a closed bound interval) where choice
is irrelevant. But this is just the epistemological role of assumptions. Without assumptions,
there would be no significant result. So, MM’s use of EA (which implies ZA) does restrict
the feasible set, and so do the other assumptions about frictionless market.
The fact that MM’s “proof makes no assumption about managerial objectives” (DeAngelo
and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 296) does not invalidate MM’s result logically, for the same reason why
the fact that EVT’s proof makes no assumption about, say, monotonicity does not invalidate
EVT. In MM’s theorem, no room is left for conflict between managers and shareholders.
If managerial objectives and agency problems are of particular concern, one should attack
neither MM’s thesis nor any of their assumptions on a logical or semantic level; one could
explicitly refuse an assumption and set a different result. Possibly, DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s
intention is just to reject MM’s thesis empirically, which implies (by modus tollens) that
(at least) one of MM’s assumptions is empirically unacceptable. But DD point the finger at
ht > 0, which is a redundant assumption, because MM’s thesis holds with ht < 0 as well. The
key assumption is ZA: If this assumption is removed, MM’s result is not implied by the other
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assumptions. In terms of the EVT, it is as if, for example, one considered non-monotonic
functions: Monotonicity has nothing to do with EVT’s thesis, so the theorem holds for non-
monotonic functions as well. From a logical point of view, no problem lies in the thesis nor
in the (redundant) assumption of monotonicity.5
To claim that in MM’s paper “irrelevance obtains, but only in an economically vacuous
sense” (DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006, p. 293) is not correct if this means that the assumption
of no-retention is restrictive. If, instead, one refers ‘economically vacuous’ to ZA and means
that ZA is empirically refutable, then the sentence may be accepted, not as a logical truth,
but as an empirical truth. If MM’s intention was to prove a thesis given a set of assumptions,
the set of assumptions guarantee the thesis; and we have seen that this set of assumptions
may be relaxed to allow for retention, which means that MM’s result is untouched. Whether
or not MM’s assumptions hold, i.e. whether or not they are realistic, acceptable, empirically
justifiable etc. is a totally different issue.
We stress that our stance should be intended as a reinterpretation and a clarification of
DD’s results, not as a critique. As anticipated, their dichotomy retention/no-retention is
useful, because it is strictly connected with Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency problems:
If agency problems are assumed, ZA must be abandoned in order to provide a more realistic
scenario. Managers may control shareholders’ wealth with dividend policy, either by choosing
retention of funds or by choosing extra distribution of dividends, but they have full control of
shareholders’ wealth only if they select retention rather than extra distribution of dividends.
This is the reason why retention is important: DeAngelo and DeAngelo deserve credit for
underlining that agency theory makes MM’s assumptions inappropriate, although it is ZA,
not retention, that has to be considered inappropriate. Agency problems conflict with ZA
because managers are inclined to retain part of the FCF to pursue personal objectives, a
problem that in MM’s treatment of dividend policy does not arise. Removing the zero-NPV
assumption, agency problems comes to the fore (or, vice versa, coming agency problems to the
fore, ZA is removed) and the fact that full controllability of shareholders’ wealth is possible
only with retention make managers eager of distracting funds from distribution (see Table 5,
where the first case refers to the MM’s assumptions and thesis). Whether this is compensated
or not by the need of increasing dividends in the attempt of manipulating price has to do
5One might say that comparing a mathematical theorem with a proposition bearing economic content is not
admissible. However, we are just comparing the logical structures that the two Propositions share: Both are
deductive arguments with one thesis which follows from a set of assumptions. This schema is rather obvious
in any scientific field that makes use of deduction.
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with the introduction of a further assumption in the model: Dividend policies bear (or do
not bear) informational content (signalling theory).
In essence, the following sentences hold:
1. MM prove that dividend irrelevance holds with a set of assumptions, among which are
EA and ht > 0
2. MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem holds even if EA is replaced by ZA, which does not
require that each activity has a zero NPV
3. MM’s dividend irrelevance theorem holds even if the assumption ht > 0 is removed,
allowing for any choice of ht ∈ R, t = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1
4. MM does not hold if the zero-NPV assumption is removed
5. the assumptions of managers pursuing personal objectives is incompatible with ZA
(unless personal objectives and shareholders’ objectives coincide). Therefore
6. to assume that managers pursue personal objectives means that ZA is removed, because
agency problems are present
7. if ZA is removed, dividend policy is relevant.
Table 5. ZA out, agency problems in
F† F F F
FIP‡ FIP FIP FIP
EA ZA AP] AP
Set of assumptions
ht > 0 ht < 0 ht > 0\
Dividends irrelevance YES YES NO NO
Dividends depend on − − managers new shareholders
†F=Frictionless market, ‡FIP=Fixed investment policy
]AP=Agency problems, \The sign of ht is a managers’ choice
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Conclusions
This paper first sets aside any linguistic ambiguity of the expression “dividend irrelevance”
by introducing the formal unambiguous Definition 1, according to which one may say that
dividend policy is irrelevant if the following key assumption is made: The portfolio of extra
activities has zero NPV. Therefore, relevance or irrelevance does not depend on the fact that
retention is allowed or not. From a mathematical perspective, the major dichotomy is zero-
NPV/nonzero-NPV, which enables one to extend Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) result even in
the retention case studied by DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006). Therefore, MM’s assumption
of no-retention is irrelevant, while ZA is relevant, because if the assumption ht > 0 is removed
MM’s dividend theorem still holds, whereas if one removes ZA, MM’s theorem does not hold
any more.
The dichotomy retention/no-retention is nonetheless useful: If retention is chosen by
managers, then NPV is determined by managers’ actions; if extra-distribution is chosen by
managers, NPV is determined by expectations of new shareholders. In other words, share-
holders’ wealth is fully controllable by managers only in case of retention. Thus, retention
has not to do with irrelevance (the zero-NPV assumption is the cardinal assumption) but has
to do with the controllability of shareholders’ wealth by managers. Managers have incentive
in retaining funds because they can fully control shareholders’ wealth. Therefore, one may
certainly claim that retention bears a strong relation to dividend irrelevance issues if agency
problems are assumed. Reinterpreting this way DeAngelo and DeAngelo’s paper, their con-
tribution is noteworthy in that it not only sweeps away any misbelief that dividend policy
is, in general, irrelevant, but also allows us to ask for removal of ZA, which is in contrast
with Jensen’s (1986) agency theory: Managers are inclined to retain funds, which makes the
possibility of negative-NPV activities highly realistic.
Whether managers may have some power on shareholders’ wealth even in the case of
no-retention with issues of new stocks, depends on whether a further assumption is added:
Managers may influence shareholders’ expectations.
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